Philosophy of Mind Ser.: What Are Mental Representations? by Krzysztof Dołęga (2020, Hardcover) online kaufen

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Product Identifiers

PublisherOxford University Press, Incorporated

ISBN-100190686677

ISBN-139780190686673

eBay Product ID (ePID)23050038896

Product Key Features

Number of Pages344 Pages

Publication NameWhat Are Mental Representations?

LanguageEnglish

Publication Year2020

SubjectMind & Body, General

TypeTextbook

AuthorKrzysztof DołęGa

Subject AreaPhilosophy

SeriesPhilosophy of Mind Ser.

FormatHardcover

Dimensions

Item Height1.1 in

Item Weight24.7 Oz

Item Length6 in

Item Width9.3 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional

LCCN2020-015569

Reviews"Essential reading for anyone with an interest in the philosophy of Cognitive Science." -- Ray Buchanan and Alex Grzankowski, Metascience, "Are mental representations real (and what would that mean anyway)? Should the notion of mental representation continue to play a core explanatory role in the sciences of mind, or it slowly being revealed as a false friend? This stunning collection covers all that ground and more. Essentialreading for philosophers, cognitive scientists, and anyone interested in the nature of mind."--Andy Clark, University of Sussex, "Essential reading for anyone with an interest in the philosophy of Cognitive Science." -- Ray Buchanan and Alex Grzankowski, Metascience"Are mental representations real (and what would that mean anyway)? Should the notion of mental representation continue to play a core explanatory role in the sciences of mind, or it slowly being revealed as a false friend? This stunning collection covers all that ground and more. Essential reading for philosophers, cognitive scientists, and anyone interested in the nature of mind." --Andy Clark, University of Sussex

Dewey Edition23

IllustratedYes

Dewey Decimal121.68

Table Of ContentPreface1. IntroductionJoulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Do/lrega, and Tobias Schlicht2. A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation Frances Egan 3. Defending Representation Realism William Ramsey4. Deflating Deflationism about Mental Representation Dan Hutto & Erik Myin 5. Representing as Coordinating with Absence Nico Orlandi 6. Reifying Representations Michael Rescorla 7. Situated Mental Representations: Why we need mental representations and how we should understand them Albert Newen and Gottfried Vosgerau 8. Representational Kinds Joulia Smortchkova and Michael Murez 9. Functionalist Interrelations Amongst Human Psychological States Inter Se, ditto for Martians Nicholas Shea 10. Nonnatural Mental Representation Gualtiero Piccinini 11. Error Detection and Representational Mechanisms Krystyna Bielecka and Marcin Mi/lkowskiIndex

SynopsisThe topic of this book is mental representation, a theoretical concept that lies at the core of cognitive science. Together with the idea that thinking is analogous to computational processing, this concept is responsible for the cognitive turn in the sciences of the mind and brain since the 1950s. Conceiving of cognitive processes (such as perception, reasoning, and motor control) as consisting of the manipulation of contentful vehicles that represent the world has led to tremendous empirical advancements in our explanations of behaviour. Perhaps the most famous discovery that explains behavior by appealing to the notion of mental representations was the discovery of 'place' cells that underlie spatial navigation and positioning, which earned researchers John O'Keefe, May-Britt Moser, and Edvard I. Moser a joint Nobel Prize in 2014. And yet, despite the empirical importance of the concept, there is no agreed definition or theoretical understanding of mental representation. This book constitutes a state-of-the-art overview on the topic of mental representation, assembling some of the leading experts in the field and allowing them to engage in meaningful exchanges over some of the most contentious questions. The collection gathers both proponents and critics of the notion, making room for debates dealing with the theoretical and ontological status of representations, the possibility of formulating a general account of mental representation which would fit our best explanatory practices, and the possibility of delivering such an account in fully naturalistic terms. Some contributors explore the relation between mutually incompatible notions of mental representation, stemming from the different disciplines composing the cognitive sciences (such as neuroscience, psychology, and computer science). Others question the ontological status and explanatory usefulness of the notion. And finally, some try to sketch a general theory of mental representations that could face the challenges outlined in the more critical chapters of the volume., The topic of this book is mental representation, a theoretical concept that lies at the core of cognitive science. Together with the idea that thinking is analogous to computational processing, this concept is responsible for the "cognitive turn" in the sciences of the mind and brain since the 1950s. Conceiving of cognitive processes (such as perception, reasoning, and motor control) as consisting of the manipulation of contentful vehicles that represent the world has led to tremendous empirical advancements in our explanations of behaviour. Perhaps the most famous discovery that explains behavior by appealing to the notion of mental representations was the discovery of "place" cells that underlie spatial navigation and positioning, which earned researchers John O'Keefe, May-Britt Moser, and Edvard I. Moser a joint Nobel Prize in 2014. And yet, despite the empirical importance of the concept, there is no agreed definition or theoretical understanding of mental representation. This book constitutes a state-of-the-art overview on the topic of mental representation, assembling some of the leading experts in the field and allowing them to engage in meaningful exchanges over some of the most contentious questions. The collection gathers both proponents and critics of the notion, making room for debates dealing with the theoretical and ontological status of representations, the possibility of formulating a general account of mental representation which would fit our best explanatory practices, and the possibility of delivering such an account in fully naturalistic terms. Some contributors explore the relation between mutually incompatible notions of mental representation, stemming from the different disciplines composing the cognitive sciences (such as neuroscience, psychology, and computer science). Others question the ontological status and explanatory usefulness of the notion. And finally, some try to sketch a general theory of mental representations that could face the challenges outlined in the more critical chapters of the volume., Mental representations are ubiquitous in cognitive science, and are used to account for many cognitive capacities, from perception to decision making. Yet we lack a clear understanding of what they are. This collection assembles essays by leading philosophers, each trying to provide answers to the puzzles posed by mental representation., The topic of this book is mental representation, a theoretical concept that lies at the core of cognitive science. Together with the idea that thinking is analogous to computational processing, this concept is responsible for the "cognitive turn" in the sciences of the mind and brain since the 1950s. Conceiving of cognitive processes (such as perception, reasoning, and motor control) as consisting of the manipulation of contentful vehicles that represent the world has led to tremendous empirical advancements in our explanations of behaviour. Perhaps the most famous discovery that explains behavior by appealing to the notion of mental representations was the discovery of 'place' cells that underlie spatial navigation and positioning, which earned researchers John O'Keefe, May-Britt Moser, and Edvard I. Moser a joint Nobel Prize in 2014. And yet, despite the empirical importance of the concept, there is no agreed definition or theoretical understanding of mental representation. This book constitutes a state-of-the-art overview on the topic of mental representation, assembling some of the leading experts in the field and allowing them to engage in meaningful exchanges over some of the most contentious questions. The collection gathers both proponents and critics of the notion, making room for debates dealing with the theoretical and ontological status of representations, the possibility of formulating a general account of mental representation which would fit our best explanatory practices, and the possibility of delivering such an account in fully naturalistic terms. Some contributors explore the relation between mutually incompatible notions of mental representation, stemming from the different disciplines composing the cognitive sciences (such as neuroscience, psychology, and computer science). Others question the ontological status and explanatory usefulness of the notion. And finally, some try to sketch a general theory of mental representations that could face the challenges outlined in the more critical chapters of the volume.

LC Classification NumberB105.R4W44 2020