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Product Identifiers
PublisherMorgan & Claypool Publishers
ISBN-101681733595
ISBN-139781681733593
eBay Product ID (ePID)15038569878
Product Key Features
Number of Pages167 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication NameStrategic Voting
SubjectGame Theory, Political Process / Campaigns & Elections, Intelligence (Ai) & Semantics, Computer Science
Publication Year2018
TypeTextbook
AuthorPeter Stone, Reshef Meir, Ronald Brachman
Subject AreaMathematics, Computers, Political Science
SeriesSynthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Ser.
FormatTrade Paperback
Dimensions
Item Height0.4 in
Item Weight10.6 Oz
Item Length9.2 in
Item Width7.5 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceTrade
Dewey Edition23
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal324.94055
Table Of ContentPreface Acknowledgments Introduction Basic Notation Strategyproofness and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Regaining Truthfulness in Voting Voting and Mechanism Design Simultaneous Voting Games Iterative and Sequential Voting Voting Heuristics Summary: Toward a Complete Theory of Strategic Voting Bibliography Author's Biography
SynopsisProvides an examination of strategic voting. The book asks "are there voting rules that are truthful?" in the sense that all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. It then explores what happens when voters do vote strategically., Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome. In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics, and computer science. The book has two parts. The first part asks are there voting rules that are truthful? in the sense that all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point, we survey both extensions of the theorem and various conditions under which truthful voting is made possible (such as restricted preference domains). We also explore the connections with other problems of mechanism design such as locating a facility that serves multiple users. In the second part, we ask what would be the outcome when voters do vote strategically? rather than trying to prevent such behavior. We overview various game-theoretic models and equilibrium concepts from the literature, demonstrate how they apply to voting games, and discuss their implications on social welfare. We conclude with a brief survey of empirical and experimental findings that could play a key role in future development of game theoretic voting models., Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome. In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics, and computer science. The book has two parts. The first part asks "are there voting rules that are truthful?" in the sense that all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point, we survey both extensions of the theorem and various conditions under which truthful voting is made possible (such as restricted preference domains). We also explore the connections with other problems of mechanism design such as locating a facility that serves multiple users. In the second part, we ask "what would be the outcome when voters do vote strategically?" rather than trying to prevent such behavior. We overview various game-theoretic models and equilibrium concepts from the literature, demonstrate how they apply to voting games, and discuss their implications on social welfare. We conclude with a brief survey of empirical and experimental findings that could play a key role in future development of game theoretic voting models.
LC Classification NumberJF1005.M457 2018
