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Product Identifiers
PublisherCambridge University Press
ISBN-100521480469
ISBN-139780521480468
eBay Product ID (ePID)998943
Product Key Features
Number of Pages404 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication NameMasters of War : Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era
Publication Year1996
SubjectUnited States / 20th Century, Military / Vietnam War, Military / United States, United States / General
TypeTextbook
AuthorRobert Buzzanco
Subject AreaHistory
FormatHardcover
Dimensions
Item Height1.1 in
Item Weight26.3 Oz
Item Length9.3 in
Item Width6.3 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional
LCCN95-016226
Dewey Edition21
Reviews"This ambitious book sweeps across the American military's relationship to the wars in Indochina and Vietnam. Drawing on an impressive range of primary sources, Buzzanco analyzes the military's view of the war, differences among the sevices, and civil-military relations." Journal of Military History, '... his book has merit, not only as a polemic but as a well-argued case study on how a war should not be conducted. The book has sheer readability.' Defense Analysis, "Buzzanco is particularly interesting on the views of military dissenters, including senior generals, who opposed either the war itself or the way the United States chose to wage it....there is much to be learned here." Foreign Affairs, "No serious student of the Vietnam War can afford to miss this challenging and superbly researched book....Presents the most complete and nuanced account of the U.S. military's attitudes and actions toward Vietnam during the years 1950-1968...." Political Science Quarterly, "Buzzanco has written a bold, provocative book that challenges many assumptions. Based on judicious research in primary and secondary sources, Masters of War is a mandatory read for anyone interested in the military history of the Vietnam War." Houston Chronicle, "This work provides new insight on dissent within the ranks of the American military concerning policy and strategy during the warin Southeast Asia....should be examined by students and scholars...." History, "The author has written an interesting and thought-provoking account of the relationship between civilian policy makers and their counterparts in the military during the Vietnam War." Pacific Affairs, '… his book has merit, not only as a polemic but as a well-argued case study on how a war should not be conducted. The book has sheer readability.' Defense Analysis, "A diligently researched and thought-provoking contribution to the literature of Vietnam." Kirkus Reviews, ‘… his book has merit, not only as a polemic but as a well-argued case study on how a war should not be conducted. The book has sheer readability.’Defense Analysis, "Masters of War will be most useful to those who already know a good dea about U.S. policy in Vietnam; they will find much that is new and significant....." Edwin E. Moise, Journal of Asian Studies, "This is a brilliantly argued account that tells us who was responsible for what in Vietnam. It challenges some of our basic assumptions." Seymour Hersh, author of My Lai Four: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal973.9/23
Table Of Content1. Introduction; 2. Prologue to tragedy: US military opposition to intervention in Vietnam, 1950-1954; 3. Preparing for and avoiding war: military affairs and politics in Vietnam and the United States, 1955-1960; 4. Pinning down the president: JFK, the military, and political manoeuvering over Vietnam, January-October 1961; 5. The best and worst of times: the US war against Vietnam, October 1961-November 1963; 6. 'Seeing things through Vietnam': LBJ, the military, and the growing U.S. commitment to Vietnam, November 1963-December 1964; 7. Hope for the best, expect the worst: US ground troops enter the war in Vietnam, January-July 1965; 8. War on three fronts: US forces vs. the VC, Westmoreland vs. the marine, and the military leaders vs. the White House, July 1965-December 1966; 9. 'The platform of false prophets is crowded': public hope and private despair in Vietnam, 1967; 10. The myth of the Tet: military failure and the politics of war; 11. Conclusion: bringing it all back home; Epilogue; Notes; Bibliography.
SynopsisThroughout the past decade, defenders of the U.S. role in Vietnam have argued that America's defeat was not the result of an illegitimate intervention or military shortcomings, but rather a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to "fight with one hand tied behind their backs." In this volume, Robert Buzzanco disproves this theory by demonstrating that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policymakers always understood the problems and peril of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped lead the United States into the war. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the U.S. role in Vietnam., This volume convincingly disproves the ‘fighting with one hand tied behind our backs’ explanation of America’s defeat in Vietnam., This volume convincingly disproves the claim that America's defeat in Vietnam was the result of a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to 'fight with one hand tied behind their backs.', Throughout the last decade, defenders of the US role in Vietnam have argued that America's defeat was not the result of an illegitimate intervention or military shortcomings but rather a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to 'fight with one hand tied behind their backs.' In this volume, Robert Buzzanco disproves this theory by demonstrating that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policymakers always understood the problems and peril of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped lead the United States into the war. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the US role in Vietnam.
LC Classification NumberDS559.62.U6 B89 1996
