Meistverkauft in Wirtschaft & Industrie
Hier sparen: Wirtschaft & Industrie
- EUR 6,75Preistendenz: EUR 8,03
- EUR 16,87Preistendenz: EUR 23,55
Über dieses Produkt
- KurzbeschreibungThe Metropolitan Water District of Southern<br>California (MET), a cooperative of retail and<br>wholesale water utilities, serves 18 million people.<br>This case study explains how MET -- as a cooperative<br>-- is inefficient and how its member agencies suffer<br>from this inefficiency. I show that MET is<br>inefficient by demonstrating that its members have<br>heterogeneous preferences over outcomes: Members that<br>are more dependent on MET prefer policies that<br>increase water supply; others prefer lower rates.<br>Although heterogeneity had existed since at least the<br>1940s, MET avoided conflict well into the 1970s. I<br>explore two possibilities for efficiency despite<br>heterogeneity. First, MET had so much water that it<br>could treat it as a club good, i.e., members did not<br>need to agree on policies over non-rival water.<br>Second, member agencies may have had social<br>preferences (one for all and all for one). Shrinking<br>subsidies and supplies in the 1960s changed water<br>from a club to private good. The end of social<br>preferences is not so obvious, so I asked MET's<br>member agency managers to participate in public goods<br>experiments. They do not appear to have social<br>preferences.
- AutorDavid Zetland
- Seiten180 Seiten
- Gewicht255 g
Dieser Artikel gehört nicht auf diese Seite.
Vielen Dank. Wir kümmern uns darum.